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In the wake of the attack of 9/11, the United States government recognized that the 
manner in which threats and information were conveyed was extremely inefficient, and in 
many cases completely nonfunctional due to disparate data failing to become accurately 
coalesced. This is especially true within the area of intermodal cargo shipping. Our 
research explores and seeks to inform the development of requirements for an 
information-sharing system amongst harbor cargo operators engaged in intermodal 
shipping. Through interviews conducted of MIST’s federal and local partners, careful 
examination of existing MIST findings, and research into best practices in information 
system design, we seek to provide an analysis of current needs and recommendations for 
improvements to communications about threats to intermodal shipping. Our qualitative 
findings, found through interviewing communication systems operators and users, 
indicate that the generalized lack of trust has created limits to communication that have 
manifested themselves in different electronic solutions that appear to have been 
developed without direct input from operators. We also find that there exist overland 
enterprises (e.g., trucking industry) that lack motivation to provide funding for improved 
communications infrastructure. Future research efforts may include further identification 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States relies heavily upon its sea-lanes to deliver and receive 
economic goods. Each delivery seaport requires sound and reliable security to ensure the 
proper handling of these goods. Information sharing structures help protect this critical 
supply chain. Specifically, there are a number of communication channels that are 
currently used to support the sharing of threat information in the maritime industry. Two 
primary channels are face-to-face meetings and websites. However, each of these 
channels has its limitations.  
Face-to-face meetings are an effective means of exchanging threat information 
and helping stakeholders better understand inner agency workings. However, these 
activities keep people from their normal duties, and thus limit their productivity and 
attendance. This challenge is especially present in smaller ports where there is minimal 
staff. Thus, these meetings often fail to accomplish their objectives when personnel 
simply cannot attend due to work demands. websites have also been developed to solve 
information sharing problems by leveraging technology to overcome the barriers of time 
and place. While many of these websites are proficient in some areas; almost all are of 
limited utility because of the lack of useful and easy-to-use information. These issues and 
those arising from  the operators’ reluctance to use these websites, can be addressed by 
engaging users and seeking new ideas to help determine best fit architectures to assist in 
Information Sharing. 
In the fall of 2008, the Naval Postgraduate School began the Multimodal 
Information Sharing Team (MIST) to investigate possible improvements to the sharing of 
threat information in America’s ports. MIST conducted local events at ports across the 
U.S. that included site studies, workshops, and community building activities. MISTs 




 Identify incentives for sharing threats 
 Clarify the needs of the private sector in the sharing of threat information 
 Investigate ways to streamline government requests 
 Explore solutions that improve local collaboration.  
MIST has identified several issues that have limited the sharing of intermodal 
shipping information. Conventional solutions, such as weekly security meetings for 
instance, are being employed in the busiest ports and have experienced limited success. 
Harbor personnel are also somewhat resistant to new technology despite well-meaning 
websites that still have not provided the information that they need in a way that works 
for them. Expanding on the on-going research of the Multimodal Information Sharing 
Team (MIST) at NPS, we will conduct interviews of MIST’s federal and local partners to 
help clarify the specific needs of the Boston maritime shipping community. 
Given the challenges in information sharing, this research seeks to better inform 
the development of requirements for an information sharing system amongst harbor 
operators. These requirements will seek to leverage existing technologies and meet the 
specific needs of the maritime community in varied environments. 
Future efforts can build on this research by researching the development of 
information sharing systems that are tightly coupled to diverse roles such as emergency 
action in the wake of a major catastrophe. In those scenarios, multiple agencies often 
have a need to coordinate their efforts across information sharing medium with in which 
individual participants may not have experience. Such research, could further enhance the 
importance of being able to dynamically scale information sharing to a relevant few users 
or as many as necessary. Another worst-case scenario presented by disaster relief 
operations is flexibility to shift information sharing across multiple mediums when one of 
the avenues of delivery is denied—i.e., no phone coverage, no intranet, nor available 




B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States needs improved information sharing structures in the threat 
environment of intermodal shipping. This research will help inform the development of 
requirements for an information sharing system amongst harbor operators engaged in 
intermodal shipping. Through interviews conducted of MIST’s federal and local partners, 
careful examination of existing MIST findings, and research into best practices in 
information system design, we seek to provide an analysis of current needs and 
recommendations for improvements. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To support our research, we will review the following topics: 
 Background, history, and policy issues relating to the sharing of maritime 
threat information. 
 Recent findings on information sharing needs and gaps in port security 
 Best practices in human factors design of information systems 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. How have mutually exclusive efforts of information sharing services 
impacted quality of information sharing? 
2. How would one of the existing multi service information sharing tools be 
improved to selectively incorporate information useful to any roles that are 
involved in harbor operations? 
3. How can we understand the effects of replacing face-to-face meetings with 
the introduction of a technology? 
4. How can an information sharing structure be designed that leverages 




E. RESEARCH METHODS 
Our qualitative approach will include a review of existing reports on the sharing 
of threat information, a literature review of best practices in the design of information 
systems, and semi-structured interviews of U.S. Coast Guard stakeholders in the Port of 
Boston. Our interview questions are: 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please 
 describe your challenges in receiving and distributing that information. 
2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control 
 (C2) systems to share information?  
a. What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are 
used?  
3. How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training 
 requirement for newly arriving personnel?  
4. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors 
considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
a. Ease of use? 
b. Desirability (of wanting to use the system)? 
c. Usefulness? 
5. In a perfect world—without any constraints—how might information 
 sharing be improved within the Coast Guard? 
F. PROPOSED DATA, OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
Reports will be analyzed for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to a 
sustainable information sharing system. Our literature review will be used to identify key 
human and strategic factors involved in the design of usable information systems. 
Interviews will be analyzed to identify specific information sharing needs and challenges. 
Finally, we will analyze all of the above to create a fit comparison of common criteria 
anchored in human factors. 
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G. POTENTIAL BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The potential benefits of this research are that the government will be able to 
develop common criteria for maritime information sharing that takes into account human 
factors. These common criteria may provide harbor personnel a structure for future 
designs. Ultimately, the benefit would come in the form of improved security of harbors. 
The limitations of this research are the model chosen may be inadequate for certain 
harbors. 
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 The thesis research and findings will be organized in the following manner: 
 
I. General Information and Introduction 
II. Literature Review 
 III. Methodology 
IV. Decomposition of the U.S. Coast Guard’s experiences in information 
systems design 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations for follow on work 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS 
What is an information sharing system? The DoD defines information sharing as 
“Making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems) (Grimes, 
2007). To this definition, this thesis intensifies the discussion by further adding that the 
effectiveness of these transmissions can potentially save millions of lives. In 2008, the 
terrorists that attacked the Taj Mahal and many other spots in Mumbai, India, did so 
initially from a hijacked fishing vessel, then transferred to a rubber dinghy directly into 
Mumbai Harbor; thus exploiting India’s weak communication system and carrying out 
one of the most gruesome terror attack in many decades. It was during that same year in 
November, that MIST stood up at the Naval Postgraduate School. The Multimodal 
Information Sharing Team “(MIST) engages with government agencies and private sector 
shipping to improve the sharing of threat information” (Salem, 2011). 
MIST looked at several facets of information sharing systems, and what the de-
facto standards were for that time. Heavily focused on the directives provided by the 9/11 
commissions guidance, their keen insights provide the basis of this thesis, and will be 
referred to throughout its pages. As of this writing, the most recent publication of MIST, 
was from its Boston seminar, which also helped to explore many of the questions posed 
in this thesis. Some interesting results were noted by the researchers with MIST, which 
will presented here for comparison to what the Coast Guard must balance on a day to day 
basis. 
MIST’s key findings, which will be examined in greater depth in Chapter IV 
were: explorations of motivations, collaborative capacity, and threat information. The 
seminar experienced a modest turnout as there was a fair amount of competition for 
participants, but many would chose to try to attend both seminars over the course of the 
week in November to the benefit of the MIST researchers. By benefit, it is meant that 
having individuals who may not have otherwise been funded to attend this federally 
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hosted seminar show up brought a unique accent to the Boston’s seminar. This thesis will 
focus on is what made the Coast Guard a stand out and specifically why they stood out.  
What appeared to be missing from the research was the question: how did the 
Coast Guard build trust among port partners to a level that each felt comfortable sharing 
threat information; while at the same time knowing that they would deploy that 
information responsibly. Perhaps a more interesting question from the authors’ point of 
view was; what had the Coast Guard gained or lost in the shadow of its much larger 
parent organization DHS that would enrich the discussion of what future system 
requirements will be? 
MIST’s report recognized the Coast Guard several times in a sort of best in class 
type of recognition for essentially garnering the trust of other port partners. So, what is 
the Coast Guard’s Strategy for information sharing? The Coast Guard currently follows 
parent organization DHS, so some highlight of that strategy will be delineated here, 
followed by a brief summary of the National strategy for information sharing, and finally, 
the highlights of the DoD’s information sharing strategy will provide some factors for 
comparison. 
The DHS’s strategy for information sharing is a very dynamic approach to a very 
difficult problem and GAO has marked them low for compliance on a number of issues 
like measures of effectiveness or listing users of the system. One could reasonably make 
the argument that as it has such a difficult task, the standard time lines cannot be applied 
to DHS in its efforts. What is very apparent in the language of DHS’s information sharing 
strategy, is that it is still very open ended or non-committal. (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2011) What DHS has done is rather ingenious, in that this looseness of initial 
conditions allows defining the environment these systems will operate in and ensures a 
best fit. Its guiding principles are: fostering information sharing, use the established 
governance structure, committing sufficient resources to its development, measuring 
progress toward goals, and finally maintaining information and data security while 
protecting privacy and civil liberties (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
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Because of DHS’s need to accommodate both public and private sectors that are 
port partners, their strategy does have many similar policies to those of the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS). The NSIS is the overarching information 
strategy, which best practices in information exchange between public and private port 
partners go for guidance on how to best communicate with their neighbors. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Foundations of the National Strategy for Information Sharing (From National 
Strategy For Information Sharing Successes and Challenges in Improving 
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, 2007) 
The DoD’s information sharing strategy is much more defined than DHS’s 
because DoD has a reasonable expectation that they have fewer stakeholders and none of 
the real commercial complications that DHS does. DoD’s goals as defined in DoD 
Information Sharing Strategy (Grimes, 2007) and they are clear: promote, encourage, and 
incentivize sharing, achieve an extended enterprise, strengthen agility, to accommodate 
unanticipated partners and events, and finally, ensure trust across organizations. Unlike 
DHS, the DoD also has clearly defined stovepipes to the sharing of information which 





mobility, make information a force multiplier through sharing, promote a federated 
information sharing community/environment, and finally, address the economic reality of 
information sharing (Grimes, 2007). 
B. BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND POLICY ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SHARING OF MARITIME THREAT INFORMATION 
When John Smith discovered Boston Harbor in 1614 he could not have 
envisioned what a significant role it would have in the history of the colonies nor its 
growth into one of the most important harbors in present day intermodal shipping to and 
from the United States. Boston Harbor is the oldest continually active port in the Western 
Hemisphere and acts as the maritime hub for all of New England. Some 34,000 people 
rely on Boston Harbor for their employment and more than eight billion dollars in 
revenue is introduced into the local, regional, and national economies through indirect, 
direct, and induced impact (MASSPORT, 2011). Because Boston’s busy harbor and close 
proximity to a major population, supply chain security is of the utmost importance for the 
Department of Homeland Security which has a relatively large footprint in Boston Harbor 
as well. 
Boston Harbor is part of the larger Massachusetts Harbor, which comprises 50 
square miles with 180 miles of shoreline and 34 harbor islands (MASSPORT, 2011). The 
outer harbor is comprised of three bays to the South East of Logan International Airport; 
Dorchester, Quincy, and Hingham. There are two deep-water anchorages that are 
separated by Long Island, which marks the beginning of where the two channels begin. 
The two channels being, President Roads for the entry point to the Inner Harbor and 
Nantasket Roads for entry to the Weymouth Back River and the Weir River. 
The many associations that operate close to Boston Harbor and are relevant to this 
thesis are Volpe Center, State Fusion Center, Boston Fusion Center, and the Regional 
Intel Center. (Salem, 2011) The commercial operators currently operating in Boston 
Harbor, are a veritable who’s who of global shipping giants that include two of the top 
ten largest in the world; Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and China Ocean 
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Shipping Company (COSCO). This list also includes FedEx, Delta Airlines, and various 
other global maritime shipping and local maritime shipping companies. 
C. RECENT FINDINGS ON INFORMATION SHARING NEEDS AND GAPS 
IN PORT SECURITY 
Volpe Center is unique in that their vision is “to be the leading federal center of 
excellence for innovative transportation systems solutions” (Administration, 2011). 
Volpe Center’s mission, which is “To improve the nation’s transportation systems” 
(Administration, 2011) will make them a key reference throughout this thesis. Their 
strategic goals include: contributing to solving U.S. DOT’s key challenges, influencing 
the direction of the national transportation enterprise, ensuring a sustainable business 
model, and continuously developing the center’s human capital. Volpe Center enjoys a 
reputation for being entrepreneurial, market driven, and innovative and is consulted 
regularly by both government and private interests (RITA, 2011). 
The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative defines a fusion Center as “A 
collaborative effort of two or more agencies who provide resources, expertise and/or 
information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, 
apprehend and respond to criminal and terrorist activities” (Burke, 2007). This is echoed 
in the State of Massachusetts’s fusion centers mission statement: 
The Commonwealth fusion Center collects and analyzes information from 
all available sources to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence 
stakeholder to strategic and tactical decision-making in order to disrupt 
domestic and international terrorism. (Burke, 2007)  
The State of Massachusetts fusion centers goals are as follows: work in 
partnership with local, state, regional and federal public safety agencies; implement 
secure, comprehensive mechanism for the timely exchange of information; provide 
accurate and timely intelligence products; provide direct analytical support for 
investigations involving precursor criminal activity; and promote awareness of priority 
intelligence requirements and of indicators of threats to the Commonwealth. (Burke, 
2007) The state and Boston’s fusion centers generally act as a central repository for 
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information and analysis accessible by almost all law-enforcement agencies that operate 
within the state of Massachusetts (Burke, 2007). This information is deliverable to these 
agencies in the form of products that are bulletins, intelligence, and information’s 
briefings and strategic assessments. 
Over the years, Boston Harbor has either led the field or been near the top in its 
efforts to keep pace with technological changes involved in intermodal shipping. Today 
the character of Terry Malloy played by Marlon Brando in the 1960s movie On the 
Waterfront would be more likely to carry a clipboard with the day’s choreographed 
movement of containers than anything that would in fact be shipped. The days of the 
stevedores busily handling large bags of coffee and barrels of oil are long gone and have 
instead been replaced by enormous gantry cranes capable of lifting in excess of 50,000 
pounds (Levinson, 2006). What has triggered these role reversals? The introduction of 
containerization to the shipping industry by a company in New York named McAllister 
Trucking. McAllister Trucking had the vision to see that the more times cargo was 
handled the more expensive the process was (Levinson, 2006). This realization 
revolutionized the shipping industry from the ports that handled the containers, the ships 
that moved the containers, to the supply chains that developed because of the containers. 
On any given day, the port of Boston is buzzing with activity; gantry cranes lift stacks of 
40 foot long containers out of the lower holds of the enormous oceangoing container 
ships onto waiting trucks where they can be halfway across the state and on local 
warehouses that same day. 
In South Boston, Massport’s Paul W. Conley container terminal sits on 500 acres 
of waterfront property, and handles close to 1.5 million metric tons of cargo each year. 
Some of the top containerized imports include beer and wine, frozen seafood, furniture, 
footwear, and toys. The chief exports are paper, which includes wastepaper, scrap metal, 
autos, skins, hides, logs and lumber (MASSPORT, 2011). Perhaps more interesting and 
certainly more relevant to this thesis is what the Port of Boston handles as containerized 
and bulk; 15 Million metric tons of which include petroleum, natural gas, gypsum, and 
salt. These cargoes are a small concern; however, when positioned in close proximity to 
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large populations, the cargoes become valuable terrorist targets. It is for these reasons 
that the port of Boston has one of the best-established information sharing systems in 
current usage in the country. 
Like many of the other harbors within the United States, Boston, because of the 
sheer volume of containers that are handled there, is a likely target to not only venders for 
movement of goods, but terrorists for movement of weapons as well (Salem, 2011). 
Indeed, Boston’s major population, adjacent to Conley Terminal, where containers are 
unloaded and loaded daily, presents its own set of unique challenges. “This high-
efficiency transportation machine is a blessing for exporters and importers, but it has 
become a curse for customs inspectors and security officials” (Levinson, 2006). The 
threat surface, when discussing supply chain type vectors, has to take into account the 
factors depicted in Figure 2. 
Boston Harbor may be ideally suited to test potential solutions to these threats 
because of its tight-knit maritime community. However, with so many stakeholders and 
so much at stake, the DHS has a difficult task if they wish to come up with a lasting 





Figure 2.   Container Movement. (From United States. Government Accountability 
Office, 2010c)  
As of September 2010, there were four competing technologies to help alleviate 
the problem, those technologies are listed in Table 1. DHS should test and evaluate 
container security technologies consistent with all identified operational scenarios to 
ensure the technologies will function as intended”: (Government Accountability Office, 
2010c) The GAO’s report indicated that DHS needed to test containers on parameters 
that would be consistent with all threats. This difficult task was complicated by the fact 
that the containers are the perfect vessel to intermodal transport of goods. To overlay 




Description of DHS S&T’s Four Container 
Security Projects Project name 
Project description and goal 
Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD) Develop a device that can detect and report container intrusion 
on all six sides of a container.  
Container Security Standards and Devices (CSD) Develop a device that can detect and report the opening or 
removal of container doors.  
Hybrid Composite Container (HCC) Develop a composite container with embedded security sensors 
to detect intrusion on all six sides.  
Marine Asset Tracking Tag System (MATTS) Establish a system to track containers, and increase the range 
that CSDs and ACSDs can communicate.  
Source: GAO analysis of DHS S&T information. 
Table 1.   Competing Technologies 
All technological solutions in Table 1 attempt to ensure that any unauthorized or 
undocumented opening can be easily detected. However, all of these solutions are still 
only as good as the humans who maintain them. Thus, the problem moves back to a 
neuron’s solution as opposed to an electron solution which demands a stronger focus on 
information flows, incentives to cooperation between stakeholders, and a thorough 
analysis of information desirability. 
As one of the organizations that has traditionally been charged with upholding 
federal policies, the Coast Guard has been viewed by its port partners as an organization 
that takes a pragmatic approach to their implementations. In this capacity, the 
organization struggles to strike the proper balance between those same partners and 
upholding the law. However, as reflected in the interview with the (Operator, 2011), there 
has been a host of new laws pushed down on the Coast Guard to enforce and there is also 
a tremendous amount of overlap of these policies which only confuses port partners. As 
the Coast Guard calls into question some of the newer laws, they become increasingly 
busy dealing with a population that has grown weary of any new mandates and in effect 
lost faith in the Coast Guard as a trusted partner further pushing the federal government 
out of the day to day workings of the harbors it seeks to control. 
16 
 
D. BEST PRACTICES IN HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN OF INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
Another ramification of 9/11 was that the U.S. government struggled to improve 
the sharing of threat information amongst all communities that were to be working 
together underneath Homeland Security. Most notably among the mandates that were 
passed by Congress was the U.S. Patriot Act, which was designed to ensure there would 
be no obstructions between criminal investigations and intelligence operations. This 
however was a smaller effort then the presidential executive order 13228, which saddled 
DHS with fixing the fragmented information systems that predated that department. The 
current state of information flow in Boston may be aptly characterized as fragmented and 
very complex, and yet it is through this adversity that Boston Harbor has emerged as one 
of the best examples of human systems filling in the gaps that are either created or left 
from multiple communication systems that had been developed exclusively from one 
another. 
Adding to the challenges offered in Boston Harbor, are its sizeable population in 
close proximity to the Harbor. It is a shared space with one of the busier airports in all of 
the United States, and the fact that so many agencies are responsible for overseeing an 
extremely robust commercial operational environment make things difficult as well. This 
thesis will highlight the unique approach that the United States Coast Guard has 
employed which has earned it high marks by all entities in both Boston Harbor and 
throughout the ports in which they have a role. 
The stakeholder’s organizations in Boston Harbor that support information 
sharing of some kind are presented here in four lists: private sector, regional and state, 
city, and federal organizations: This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but provides a 
survey of regional resources available for sharing multimodal security threat information. 
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E. PUBLIC-SECTOR RESOURCES 
1. State Resources 
Boston Emergency Medical Services (BEMS) Has the responsibility of 
providing emergency medical services within the City of Boston (City of Boston, 2012). 
Boston EMS Medical Intelligence Center (MIC) To connect Boston’s EMS to 
the public and private entities responsible for first response, hospital services, and public 
health and safety the Stephen M. Lawlor Medical Intelligence Center Boston EMS also 
works within the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) to stay informed (City of 
Boston, 2012). 
Boston Fire Department (BFD) Upholds their commitment to serving the 
community by protecting life, property and the environment utilizing some 467 
uniformed personnel and managing two Divisions and eleven districts. (City of Boston, 
2012) 
Boston Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Enhances the City 
of Boston and Metro-Boston Homeland Security Region’s (MBHSR) capacity to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from major emergencies. (City of Boston, 2012) 
Boston Police Department (BPD) Partnering with the community of Boston to 
improve citizen quality of life by fighting crime, and reducing the fear of crime (City of 
Boston, 2012). 
Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) Gathers and analyzes intelligence 
to inform BPD tactical strategies. Intelligence is focused on mitigating threats related to 
organized crime, terrorism, or individual acts of violence. Actionable intelligence related 
to threat information is shared with local stakeholders to prepare and respond to threat 
incidents. (Salem, 2011) 
Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) Information aggregator aimed at 
disrupting international terrorism. (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2012c) 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Responsible for the 
state’s resilience to disaster (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2012b) 
Massachusetts State Police Responsible for providing policing activities for the 
public safety inclusive of roadway trafficking, crime reduction, and patrol services for 




U.S. Coast Guard Sector Boston Responsible for container, domestic vessel, and 
facility inspections, waterway management, port control, and homeland security 
investigations duties within the Boston Harbor area (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, n.d.). 
Volpe Center Mission is to improve the Nation’s transportation system. Their 
work is performed for U.S. DOT, as well as other Federal, state, local, and international 
agencies and entities (RITA, n.d.). 
2. Federal Resources 
U.S. Coast Guard National Headquarters Protects the maritime economy and 
the environment, defends our maritime borders, and saves those in peril at sea (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2012, May 16). 
United States Coast Guard Interagency Operations Center (IOC) The IOC 
framework enables a unified coalition of port agencies to conduct and apply risk-based 
operational planning for efficient, collaborative use of multi-agency resources for 
improved operational effectiveness (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Mission is keeping terrorists and their 
weapons out of the U.S. It also has a responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and 
travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security., 2012). 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) To prevent, to protect, to 
respond, and to recover, as well as to build in security, to ensure resilience, and to 
facilitate customs and exchange (U.S. Department of Homeland Security., 2012). 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Serve the United States by ensuring 
a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient transportation system that meets our vital 
national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into 
the future (United States Department of Transportation, 2012, March 27). 
Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (DOT – MARAD) 
Improve and strengthen the U.S. marine transportation system to meet the economic, 
environmental and security needs of the Nation. (U.S. Department of Transportation 
Maritime Administration, 2012) 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Our continuing mission is to provide 





Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) As an intelligence-driven and a threat-
focused national security and law enforcement organization, the mission of the FBI is to 
protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to 
uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and 
criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and 
partners (FBI.gov, n.d.a). 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Boston 
The nation’s front line on terrorism: small cells of highly trained, locally based, 
passionately committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other 
specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies (FBI.gov,  
n.d. b). 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Support citizens and first 
responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our 
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all 
hazards (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 Mar 13). 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Provides analysts, operators, and 
investigators with integrated and synthesized terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and 
homeland security information needed to enhance national security and help keep our 
people safe (ISE.Information Sharing Environment, n.d.). 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Promotes homeland 
security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws 
governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d. c). 
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) Protect the United States from 
hostile and illegal threats in or emanating from the Maritime Domain, by ensuring that 
intelligence is fully integrated in support of national policy and operational decisions 
(National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office, n.d.). 
National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office (NMCO) 
Facilitate the creation of a collaborative global, maritime, information sharing 
environment through unity of effort across entities with maritime interests. In order to 
achieve Global Maritime Situational Awareness, we must increase the discoverability and 
share-ability of information relevant to those engaged in managing the security, safety, 
environment and commerce associated with the maritime domain (National Maritime 
Domain Awareness Coordination Office, 2010). 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Protects the Nation’s 
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2012 b). 
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Transportation Security Administration Freedom Center Formerly the 
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), the Transportation Security 
Administration Freedom Center in Herndon, VA, coordinates real-time intelligence 
sharing in response to security incidents and operations related of transportation 
networks. The Freedom Center acts as an operational intelligence hub to mitigate security 
threats in conjunction with the Federal Air Marshal Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies tasked with homeland 
security responsibilities (Salem, 2011). 
F. PRIVATE-SECTOR RESOURCES 
Boston Harbor Pilot Association, LLC The Boston Harbor Pilot Association is 
composed of Massachusetts’s state-commissioned pilots who operate vessels entering 
and departing the Port of Boston. They are the only state and federal pilotage service that 
operates 24/7, and their goal is to maintain environmental stewardship of the Boston 
Harbor while ensuring the safe free flow of commerce through maintaining security and 
acting in the public interest (Salem, 2011). 
Massport Owns and operates an integrated world-class transportation network 
that promotes economic growth and opportunity, enhances the quality of life of New 
England residents and protects the freedom to travel safely, securely, efficiently and cost-
effectively. Strives to always be a good steward by treating colleagues and customers 
with respect, embracing diversity and minimizing the impact of transportation services on 
our neighbors and the environment (Massport, 2012). 
Northeast Disaster Recovery Information X-Change (NEDRIX) Provides 
continuity and crisis management professionals’ access to real time governmental 
agencies information during a crisis or event (Nedrix, 2012). 
Passenger Vessels Association (PVA) Focuses on the issues and concerns most 
relevant to owners and operators of passenger vessels, manufacturers of maritime-related 
products and services and other service companies dedicated to achieving a common 
goal...working to develop a superior business environment for all (Passenger Vessel 
Association, 2007). 
Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center To 
strengthen and improve public transportation, APTA serves and leads its diverse 
membership through advocacy, innovation and information sharing. APTA and its 
members and staff work to ensure that public transportation is available and accessible 






A common sense approach was desperately needed if progress was to be made in 
streamlining communications; especially in regards to threat sharing. It was determined 
early on, that the collaboration would be instrumental in this effort. The problem was 
approached from the standpoint of, what could be done from traditional methodologies 
(not employing technology) that enhanced that collaboration. 
Weekly Group meetings called Port Operators Group Meetings are the de facto 
standard that has been the bulwark for Boston Harbors’ collaborative success. In the 
MIST Boston Report, it was the consensus amongst stakeholders that meetings were 
effective as long they were somewhat narrowly focused. Also of value from these 
meetings are text contacts and calling lists with people that trust each other and have 
contexts for how they react to different situations. It is this trust that has elevated the 
Coast Guard into its pivotal role in shaping the way an information system/threat sharing 
should work. The Coast Guard, as it works with the commercial sector every day, has 
aligned itself to enhance commercial capabilities while at the same time focusing on 
security concerns; two factors that are often diametrically opposed. 
Having reviewed three information sharing systems, a history of Boston Harbor 
was presented that highlighted the background with which thesis discussions will be 
grounded. Particular focus on what the DHS has in common with the other information 
sharing systems comparison will continue to give rise to the questions, which will be laid 
out in Chapter III. The non-exhaustive list of interests that will be impacted by any future 
information sharing system was presented to further define the landscape of possible 
consideration of alternative demands that will be placed upon it. 
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A. INITIAL CONDITIONS 
Port security has been a mission for the Coast Guard for much longer than it has 
been a hotly disputed international issue. Presently, the Coast Guard relies heavily on its 
reserve forces for port security, and they are highly skilled in its methodologies. 
Internationally, Israel is amongst the best in the business and could be considered battle 
hardened after their fuel and chemical tanks narrowly missed being ignited in 2004. “On 
March 14, two suicide bombers breached port security by hiding behind a fake walls 
placed in freight containers.” (Grillot, 2010) This passage was placed here to indicate the 
level of commitment of today’s adversaries. Had this same scenario been played out at 
one of the fuel treatment plants at Conley terminal in the Port of Boston, there would be 
hundreds if not thousands of casualties.  
MIST’s fifth seminar offered the ideal opportunity for the author to meet face to 
face with many of the individuals representing the stakeholders outlined in Chapter II. 
However, due to unforeseen financial complications in days leading up to that seminar, 
travel would not be possible. It was during this time, however, that a most optimal path 
was presented for research to the author. The Subject Matter Specialist offered research 
into what the Coast Guard was doing correctly to earn trust of its port partners in Boston 
and at all other ports for that matter. The Subject Matter Specialist obviously had a vested 
interest in determining that information as it would fuel the discussion of best practices of 
organizations to build systems that may be employed in the near future for conveying 
threats. 
Of the key findings observed by MIST; motivations were found to “energize 
human behavior and should be addressed when planning for the sharing of threat 
information.” (Salem, 2011) Collaborative capacity is “the capability of organizations to 
build the institutional mechanisms that support collaboration.” (Salem, 2011) One of the 
better known issues that was “threat information needs to be readily accessible and 
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relevant” (Salem, 2011). A fact, which was also echoed in the 9/11 commissions report. 
Finally, what the author found to be most inspiring, “local models for information sharing 
can help other ports learn best practices” (Salem, 2011). One of the more specific 
findings cited in the MIST report from the 2011 seminar in Boston had also been 
captured in one form or another in every other seminar which MIST had conducted was 
“Private sector participants want to collaborate and share information but a number of 
barriers inhibit that collaboration.” (Salem, 2011) It was also pointed out in that report, 
that as promoting and protecting the commerce, the Coast Guard has done an excellent 
job aligning itself with commercial goals. That alignment enhances the trust required for 
information to flow without fear of compromising proprietary information. It was from 
the realization that the following research questions were developed to depict lessons 
learned through trial and error of the Coast Guard. 
The first task in seeking answers to these research questions was to prune a list of 
who is who within the Coast Guard, which could characterize why an organization has 
been successful in establishing trust. To answer the research questions, suitable interview 
questions were constructed and vetted for relevance to the main questions. Those 
questions listed here when answered by the individuals that were in the meetings where 
policies were set or systems chosen will provide a best-fit solution to the overall research 
questions as well as many valuable lessons learned. 
B. WHAT IS THE BROAD MEANING OF PORT SECURITY? 
Just as the name implies, port security is the security posture experienced by a 
port relative to verifiable threats both natural and manmade. To cite a best in class for 
port security, as was indicated previously, Israel has hardened it’s harbors and even the 
incident previously illustrated, had it not been for swiftly moving security forces at the 
time, the number of dead could have easily went from sixteen to a few thousand. Having 
had experience with physical security on military instillations, there usually is no 
substitute for Guards, Guns, and Gates. Therefore, when trying to project ones thinking 
from the traditional neuron solution to one utilizing electrons, it is useful to keep in mind 
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that it is essentially changing peoples mindsets to reflect how future attacks may occur. A 
subtle point being, to move too fast is to create a system that only a small number of port 
partners would use. Yet, in going too slow, advisories that are historically much faster at 
adapting new technologies to their purpose will capitalize on its new found utility to 
render slow to field solution untenable. 
There are a number of remarkable information sharing systems which are already 
in place like Homeport, the All Partners Access Network (APAN), and the Maritime 
Domain Awareness Information Portal to name a few. What are these systems lacking? In 
short, it is customer buy in. As MIST had pointed out, there is one of a handful of factors, 
which render these complex solutions untenable. Depending on which system one choses, 
symptoms range from no security on some, to dated information on another and flat out 
useless information on others. Different password renewal processes hamper a good 
number of all of them, however, one factor stood out to this researcher, which was the 
lack of trust in one system to do everything. This lack of trust was mostly rooted in 
personal experience which may or may not reflect the current state of any system but it 
none the less rules out many of them. This means that systems have essentially ended up 
right back where they started and not solved anything. Thus, the far more interesting 
question to this researcher was just how endemic this lack of trust was only to have it 
confirmed by MIST that there is in-deed a tremendous amount of mistrust amongst port 
partners. Again, what set Boston apart from other ports that suffer similar lack of trust is 
that they have instituted weekly face-to-face meetings. Although this is an effective fix 
for the time being, it does not scale to all harbors and creates other problems, which are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
C. OVERALL RESEARCH DESIGN 
A qualitative approach was chosen for this research, as initially very little was 
understood about the general history of the Coast Guard build process for new systems, 
and only a tacit  and vague understanding of it port policies were available. A case study 
strategy was utilized with the hope that pre-9/11 methods would be somewhat varied 
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from sample to sample and would combine to form an overall picture. It was decided 
early on in the process that semi-unstructured interviews of purposeful samples would 
offer the best cross section of individuals who had an input into making the Coast Guard 
into the agency that had earned the coveted trust.  
A proposal was drafted and approved in mid-August 2011 and exists as the 
introduction chapter of this thesis. The IRB process was rigorously adhered to and an 
approval for questions was granted in the first days of September. 
As far as performing these interviews practically, it was also decided that the 
listing of samples had to be constructed using as much insider information as possible. 
This would assure that there would be true organizational type barriers that had to be 
overcome in order to be successful. More to the point, as a researcher, what was far more 
constructive, were the elements that did not work or could be improved upon to provide 
added utility to future systems developers. An initial contact was offered by the MIST 
Subject Matter Specialist for someone who was actively participating in the port security 
process in the Boston area (Operator) that was where the list started. For the next sample, 
the author used prior knowledge of individuals who were in the role of (System Manager) 
to offer their view of the process as cultivated during their watch. From those first two 
valuable contacts, the other two (Designers) were obtained for interview as well. Finally, 
a person who was actively making design decisions for the Coast Guard and who had 
signed the initial RFP for the systems that the Coast Guard currently relies on (the 
technical director) was solicited for background and future direction. 
Interviews began September 9, 2011, with the first one taking place over the 
phone with digital recording equipment. As the interviewee was located in Boston, the 
time change had to be factored in as it would also have to be in every single one of the 
interviews that were to be carried out at that time. This particular interviewee was 
particularly helpful as this had been the subject of his own personnel inquiry for several 
years and he proved to be most insightful in his role as the operator. 
The second interview took place on October 18th, 2011 in a similar fashion using 
digital recording equipment. The second interview was flavored quite differently than the 
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first however, in that the author had personally worked for this interviewee before and 
from memory recalled that the individual had experience with Rescue21 for the Coast 
Guard, which made him the ideal system manager. This particular individual was able to 
refresh the interviewer’s memory on who it was that would be the ideal (Technical 
Director) for the purposes of this thesis. 
On October 28, 2011, ten days after the interview with the system manager, the 
interview with the technical director took place with a digital recording device. This 
particular interviewee had a tremendous amount of enterprise data that could not be 
obtained from the Coast Guard’s Yearly Congressional recordings for that period. This 
interviewee was most interested in the findings of this thesis and will be on the 
distribution list with a follow up phone call for feedback. 
On November 8, 2011, ten days after the technical director interview, the fourth 
interview took place. This interviewee would be an ideal designer and offered extensive 
opinions on everything from what had gone wrong to what direction the Coast Guard 
would be moving in with its present systems. 
It was not until the day after Christmas that the final interview took place. 
Immediately, it was a different style interview in that the interviewee provided the 
interviewer with the range of their knowledge so that we were able to make the most of 
the hour-long interview. What pervaded the interview from the interviewer perspective 
was the sense that this would be the final interview. Question themes were easily recalled 
without looking at notes and a risk of embellishing the final product by getting too 
granular was a real risk. 
From an early stage in the interview phase, it was decided that whatever the 
transcription process turned out to be, a system of member checking to ensure that there 
would not be any misquoting was utilized. To accomplish this the author, (after initial 
transcription was carried out), a formal letter was drafted and submitted along with the 
electronic copy of the individual transcriptions, was sent back to all five of the 
interviewees. Four of the five made corrections with the fifth being a former supervisor 
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of the author, simply offered that he trusted the interviewer (in an e-mail) to have done a 
good job translating his remarks. 
In keeping with the mandate of the IRB findings the following questions and 
probes were put forth to interviewees: 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please 
describe your challenges in receiving and distributing that information.  
2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control 
(C2) systems to share information?  
a. What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are used?  
3. How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training 
requirement for newly arriving personnel?  
4. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors 
considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
a. Ease of use? 
b. Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
c. Usefulness? 
5. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information 
sharing be improved within the Coast Guard? 
In Section E the author will arrange the questions with a summarization of 
respondents answers to those questions. Appendix A offers mind maps these interview 
questions relative to individual points to the questions, also for the readers benefit; 
whereas, Appendix B is the transcribed interviews of each respondent one through five. 
D. CONFLICTION 
The main examples of conflict came from the designers. Designer one felt that the 
quality of training that was taking place at units was adequate. By designer two’s 
recollection, the training that was offered when a system was rolled out was little more 
than button ology that did not cover anything beyond the most simple failure of any 
system and completely lacked realism. 
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Another incident that conflicted with overall study findings was also provided by 
Designer two in her experience in the western rivers seminar in which she was 
approached by a captain of a river-tending vessel. That particular captain indicated when 
he or any of his coworkers observed something as serious as a buoy being off station, 
reported that to the Coast Guard, nothing would happen for weeks. A simple 
technological solution was also offered by Designer two of updating an electronic map 
tool that all used with a note feature so that when something of that magnitude occurred, 
the party that reported it could see that it was not simply forgotten. As a researcher who 
had been immersed in the technologies that had failed because nobody was willing to use 
them for one reason or another, her proposal ran afoul of many others. In retrospect, her 
offering would likely work for a short period of time, whereas, a broader solution would 
last much longer and would in all likelihood scale to smaller rivers better. 
This next section illustrates possible connection of points between interviewees 
and findings. Patterns will be highlighted and analyzed for relevance to each interview 
question. Followed by an analysis of where the comparisons moved the direction of the 
author in forming ideas. 
E. COMPARISON 
1. “As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please 
describe your challenges in receiving and distributing that information.” 
For the first interview question there was a view that was common to four of the 
five interviewees that of access to data. From the technical director’s point of view, better 
forms of encryption was where the emphasis needed to be placed. This is in contrast to 
the view of the operator, whose concern was with who they should be able to share 
information with in the first place. Designer one also spoke to conflicting firewall 
requirements limiting access and designer two of more physical issues like bandwidth 
allocation and turf problems. 
The operator had indicated that often, classification of information was a 
challenge that would confuse watch standers and cause them to hesitate when they 
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needed to get information out quickly. Further complicating this issue was the abundance 
of regulations that needed to be weighed, before making classification decisions. It 
appeared that the system manager had a similar opinion in that operators struggled to 
organize information into functional areas. This is often a challenge within the Coast 
Guard, as smaller operational units happen upon a situation and are forced to quickly 
make a decision as to how its transmittal should be accomplished. 
The technical director had an interesting take on information sharing in general, in 
that he indicated that information was not the problem. He cited his experience into past 
Coast Guard programs that led him to believe that technology had to be the final solution, 
which did not really resonate with the group as a whole. The technology director even 
listed a technology, which was being used by SPAWAR called crypto binding offering 
cradle to grave encryption of data. Probably the greatest contrast to that point of view 
would be offered in question three by designer two where she indicated that Coast Guards 
tendency develop a new system then throw it over the wall to see how it was received. 
2. “What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control 
(C2) systems to share information?  
a. What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that 
are used?”  
For the second interview question designer one offered a few phases of the 
Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) and a sort of iterative development. One fact 
that caught the researcher off guard was that systems were typically not tested on 
inexperienced personnel due to their complexity. The operator was unable to speak to this 
question, as he had not participated in the building of any of these systems, only their 
employment. Designer two was somewhat unsure if there was a method, but she was very 
candid in indicating how the Coast Guard gets into a big hurry whenever there are monies 
available and a desire to have a capability often to their detriment. She also indicated that 
many of the systems that look good on paper do not have any studies done to indicate if 
the average Coast Guard operations center can handle their added workload. This led to 
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her next point, that anytime a system comes up that may be of use it has to be approached 
from the standpoint of having no people to operate a terminal.  
The technical director decomposed both the Major Systems Acquisitions MSA 
manual and DHS’s SELC and offered that the best takeaway was that sponsors had to 
stay engaged in the process no matter what the system. This highlights the difference in 
perspective between designers and system administrators, with one indicating designers 
panic to get things fielded when there is money available to how admirals must often 
stand up and ask the “what for?” question. The technical director also pointed out the 
relative success the Navy had experienced employing user juries in their designs, 
however this is often too cost prohibitive for the Coast Guard to attempt. 
3. “How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training 
requirement for newly arriving personnel?” 
For question three, designer one spoke to smaller technologies being vetted in one 
particular manner and COTS being used for smaller problems. The operator was not able 
to speak to this question either. Designer two was again perfectly candid in that “They 
should be driving at training, but they are not” (Designer two, 2012). What commands 
were getting back was pretty much simple button pushing skills to their personnel. More 
specifically, she felt that there was a systemic failure to contextualize training with 
realistic operational scenarios making real failures that much more catastrophic. 
The System Manager diagramed the roadshow methodology that was often 
employed in place of classroom training and highlighted a common scene of a student 
bringing up an issue in which a capability should be offered in a system to trainers. The 
reality of road shows is that even if trainers could force the issue up the chain, by the time 
it could be implemented the whole system would be obsolete. Another problem that 
happens all too often is when the Coast Guard does get the green light to install a system, 
they have such a small window of time that they have to draft the training requirements 
from the system actually being operational. As designer one pointed out, many of these 
systems that they test are simply too large and complex to bring to an operational unit and 
obtain what real watch standers may have to contend with to get a system fielded. 
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4. “With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors  
   considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
a. Ease of use? 
b. Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
c. Usefulness?” 
Question four had the most commonality of responses in that four of the five 
interviewees indicated that human factors are highly considered in today’s system.  
This commonality of response, avoided the interviewers question purpose which 
was determining the amount of emphasis designers had put into present systems in 
common usage within the Coast Guard. Designer Two appeared to understand more of 
what the interviewer was looking for, when she delivered her answer of “not too much!” 
She did also indicate that the Coast Guard has since the Rescue21 and others had gone all 
the way toward human factors with its designs. She also offered an excellent 
characterization of the problem from her personnel experience with Rescue21 in which a 
controller at a terminal had to execute 21 button pushes to get time critical, possibly 
lifesaving information to an operator. Exhibiting the firsthand experience that was so 
crucial to the overarching purpose of this thesis and triggering a review of all other 
interviews for references to Rescue21. 
The system manager, indicated that all new systems need to be of the “one or two 
clicks” type to get something accomplished. Which one could reasonably conclude was a 
product of the Coast Guard rethinking its approach to new build type systems after 
Recue21 was forced to be recast due to its difficultly of use. This is also indicative that 
the Coast Guard has truly learned a valuable lesson to start from what the average Coast 
Guard unit is able to handle for added workloads. There was plenty of support for this 
from both the operators interview and Designer two both indicating that the average 





5. “In a perfect world—without any constraints—how might information 
sharing be improved within the Coast Guard?” 
Question five was designed to be an open forum question and interviewees were 
invited be very candid and all were very willing to oblige. The technical director 
indicated several times that the trust the Coast Guard enjoys, is mostly due to the great 
lengths it goes to handle information in accordance within originators intent. He also 
highlighted how a policy group that he had chaired for three years failed to come up with 
a viable solution to the encryption problem but he was convinced it had to be a 
technological one. There was also a reference to how the FAA assigns numbers to 
systems based on statistical methods and how that was extrapolated to system costs. He 
concluded his interview by indicating that the NSA certification of any system that is 
settled on would mean success. 
In response to question five, designer one indicated a departure from the one 
computer mentality was necessary for designers to get to the next level of systems. Single 
log in to all systems would cure many of the access issues outlined in question one. “We 
need to get past the sharing of log-ins and into the sharing of information” (Designer 
One, 2011)  
The operator view of question five was one of reducing the number of mandates 
that are out there into a single coherent set of rules that all can agree to is the first step. 
He went on to indicate that some of the policies of late, are indicative of what has been 
taking place for years, and is often delineated by three other sources. The “single point 
mooring” (Operator, 2011) type approach needs to be realized within the next few years 
in order to move beyond the trust that the Coast Guard enjoys to an organization that all 
commercial partners come to because information sharing has been implemented 
correctly. The operator also offered an observation that many of the command centers are 
broken due to turf wars that was later echoed by designer two in her response to question 
1. Next, the operator offered whatever system is settled on, there needs to be concern for 




well. He also offered that the ALMIS system was kind of a stand out in pushing 
information to those it would be relevant to although it did not have the dynamic nature 
of systems with a sense of place. 
Designer two was of the opinion that solutions would come from discussion of 
agency needs and that at the end of the day work load issues absolutely hamper the 
USCGs effectiveness. ECDIS (electronic chart) was her favorite for systems that would 
solve many of the information sharing problems. Finally, she indicated that when the 
subjects of a system notify of a condition, those subjects need to know what will be done 
and when it will be done. 
The system manager offered three points: 1.) holding people accountable for their 
actions, 2.) improving governance of systems, and 3.) focusing more on knowledge flows 
and enforcing standardization. Indeed these are the tenants of any strong system and are 
truly a reflection of this individual’s knowledge in what makes a system work from a 
managerial standpoint.  
The initial conditions summarized the backdrop of environments that this thesis 
will draw from. This summary included definitions of port security as well as a brief 
overview of what MIST’s Boston Seminar would contribute to include its key findings 
from that seminar. All thesis questions were laid out, followed by operational 
descriptions of information systems in common usage for comparison. The overall 
research design was briefly discussed which included broad descriptions of interview 
logistics concluding with a list of interview questions. A section was devoted to the 
contrasts and comparisons, that resonated with the interviewer. Overall, this chapter was 
dedicated to the interviews, which amounted to about 40% of the findings in Chapter V 
and will be decomposed against overall research questions in Chapter IV. 
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IV. DECOMPOSITION OF COAST GUARD EXPERIENCES IN 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN 
The intent in this chapter is to draw answers to main thesis questions from the 
interview questions that were asked and summarized in Chapter III. This should provide 
the connective responses to inform the conclusions of Chapter V. This will be 
accomplished by reintroducing the questions, then elucidating the themes that came up 
over the course of interviews and discussions with MIST members to the level that it 
would be considered in answering the questions. These themes, will also be punctuated 
with observations of MIST and their findings from multiple seminars. 
A. How have mutually exclusive efforts of information sharing services 
affected quality of information sharing? 
When the author originally drafted this question, the hope was that differences 
and similarities would point to one particular system over another as being a sort of best 
in class. Interviewees were quick to point out weaknesses of existing systems, but many 
of the state properties of the systems came from discussion with the Subject Matter 
Specialist and MISTs interviews with the Operators/ System Administrators. 
Systems raised “in a vacuum” 
Of the systems mentioned in the interviews, to meet a particular agencies needs in 
the port environment are becoming obvious in what their limitations are. As MIST had 
documented in their Boston seminar, the factors, which determine that utility, are 
Usefulness, Desirability, and Usability (Salem, 2011). One of these systems MARVIEW 
was developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration is 
wonderful for all three factors to the MTS. But when viewed from the lense of the Coast 
Guard or BPD it does not rise to the level that either service would be willing to put their 
investment into it. 
Another system that was designed for the Coast Guard as its enterprise Internet 
portal is HOMEPORT, which has been a realitively effective tool as mentioned by 
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designer one in his interview. Shortly before answering one of the questions with that 
example, he had indicated that the Coast Guard tends to share log-ins to those type of 
systems so that others may view its output. This may be effective to a certain extent in 
communicating with select Port partners, but has issues with much of the desired 
information being hidden away behind password protected firewalls. 
Something for everyone 
APAN was developed to act as an unsecure communication bridge amongst all 
port partners in a sort of community of communities, but due to the systems openness, is 
not suitable for passing threats that would be associated with terrorist activities, it would 
only be suitable for natural disasters. ALMIS was previously adapted in the aviation field 
of the Coast Guard as an inventory management tool that allowed planners to view what 
asset status was. When planners within the Coast Guard witnessed the utility of the 
program, it was further adapted to the marine environment. The system is very beneficial 
to the Coast Guard, but requires CAC access for it to be used, which limits any users 
outside of the Coast Guard from using it without a lot of administrative paper work, to 
get non Coast Guardsman cleared into the system. 
Nothing for everyone 
These systems were developed to meet a particular organizational need with little 
thought given to interconnectivity between collaborating agencies. This may be a 
manifestation of the turf wars, which were mentioned by two of the five interviewers. Far 
more plausible, is that these systems, which are in common usage today began their paths 
to mature systems well before the events of 9/11 when it was not that important of a 
design consideration within the Coast Guard. As was indicated by the Technical Director, 
systems went through one design pipeline or another and from inception to realization of 
the capability is usually in the range of 10 years. An inconvenient fact of this, is that the 
service lives of these systems will be greatly reduced in the heightened threat 
environment that is forcing more interconnected systems. However, it does provide the 
ideal place to begin new system requirements. 
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B. How would one of the existing multi service information sharing tools 
be improved to selectively incorporate information useful to any roles 
that are involved in harbor operations? 
This question was created while the initial literature review was taking place. 
During this time, there appeared to be an abundance of systems aimed at the sharing of 
information but depending on who was interviewed, the opinions of their functionality 
varied greatly. Thus, from a systems engineering standpoint it would be both more 
economical and timelier to enhance the features of an existing system or perhaps roll 
desirable features of one system into another creating a hybrid which would meet all 
design requirements.  
ALMIS 
When the Operator was offered an example of a new systems capability he had 
indicated that “ALMIS does a lot of that but it really does not follow the operator beyond 
the docks.” To adapt ALMIS to meet all system requirements of an information sharing 
system, would be to accelerate the TWIC program and get security clearances for all 
individuals who work in or around harbors. There is guidance to do just that but it is not 
without its controversies as MIST researchers had discovered. The addition of an 
authentication type would present few problems but the setting of Access Control Lists 
(ACLs) on each one of the data sources the system pulls from could prove difficult for 
the system to resource. 
APAN 
From an office discussion with a subject matter specialist regarding candidate 
systems which could possibly be considered, it was indicated that with APAN there was 
little that could be done to secure different channels and limit access to a user group that 
either had a Common Access Card (CAC) or one of the TWIC cards. These Broad design 






Homeport, when discussed with designer one, highlighted one of its strong 
features as, “The Coast Guard uses many channels to get information out…” and 
indicated that Homeport was quite good, but it was an access issue that precluded it as a 
possible solution. Mostly due to its core functionality lying behind Coast Guard firewalls, 
it would be difficult to adapt it to the design requirements of a future solution. The portal 
approach is worth consideration but there needs to be a higher degree of user interaction 
associated with the system that would allow spot users to post real time information 
quickly to either selected users or broadcast. This was another insight garnered from both 
the Subject Matter Specialist and the Operator. 
C. What are the human factors that are alleviated by FACE-TO-FACE 
meetings which may be addressed by the introduction of a 
technology? 
This question was designed to assess the value that the face to face meetings were 
bringing back to the communication system that had been lost in the technological chaff. 
It was felt while drafting it, that it would get at the true expectation of what makes an 
ideal information system important to its target users. Also, to pull out the shortcomings 
of going directly into technology implementation before doing proper assessments of 
target user groups. The Operator spoke to the shortcomings of the meetings with his 
statement:  “It is a great snapshot of the fragmentation of information sources.” 
This question was looked at quite closely in the Boston workshop as illustrated 
here  
First, there was strong recognition among the workshop participants of the 
purpose and value of collaboration for ensuring port security and related 
commercial viability in the Port of Boston. This acknowledged “strategic 
necessity” is the foundation for successful collaboration and has been 
recognized as key in other MIST events. (Salem, 2011) 
Familiarity with port partners 
Prior to the events of 9/11 many of the different offices that form today’s port 
partners could not tell you the name of the person that worked just across the street from 
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them. When thinking was elevated by the events of 9/11, a long look was taken at 
methods of conveying threats via technological means and was heavily scrutinized as 
being one of the chief causes of the communication breakdown. Boston took a pragmatic 
first step and went back to face-to-face meetings where it was discovered just how diluted 
they had become to security issues. Few other ports have gone to this extreme, but 
certainly, the higher threat areas took similar actions. As it turns out, other benefits 
started to manifest themselves in the form of participants building text lists so that they 
were able to send off quick notifications when relevant information changed. This is 
similar to what the Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT) method promotes 
today. All that this discovery required, was getting people to sit down once a week in the 
(Port Operator’s Group) and discuss concerns. One interesting opinion came from the 
operator, in that he felt the meetings were an absolute necessity when faced with all of 
the mandates being forced down upon his operation. 
Interconnection 
The already mentioned text networks that formed almost instantly, were really 
just the beginning of beneficial realizations, as personnel relationships spawned, and 
knowledge of what was important to each other’s agencies became known to all. This led 
to efficiencies of communications in the hypothetical form of Boatswain Mate First Class 
(BM1) Smith with the Coast Guard knowing that the CBP agent Fernandez mentioned a 
Be On the LookOut (BOLO) at last week’s port operators group meeting. BM1 Smith 
texts Agent Fernandez directly when he comes across a suspect of similar build, dress, 
ethnicity, and so forth. Efficiencies like these, remind researchers and port partners why 
they should be interested in participating in discussions of new systems that will provide 
similar results. 
Recognition of problems before they happen 
There can be no value ascribed to the urgency of a threat when it is conveyed, 
face to face by a person who knows the ramifications if that threat is realized. Often what 
breaks a chain of horrible events, is a person who is outside of its normal discussion 
pointing out an angle that through experience has become transparent to those discussing 
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it. Often the more individuals looking at a problem, subtle risks will be revealed that 
highlight a need for contingency planning. In information assurance this concept has led 
to the development of highly effective Host based Intrusion Detection Systems which the 
author believes to be a good analog the problems associated with building more effective 
communications systems. 
D. How can an information sharing structure be designed that leverages 
Boston Harbor’s findings and be scaled for use by other harbors? 
There is a broadly accepted belief that terrorists will not strike a well-protected 
harbor like Boston, when there are any number of smaller ports up and down our shores 
which represent far easier entry. Thus, any solution that is considered needs to work at 
the smaller harbors as well as the larger ones because they both comprise the threat 
surface. The Coast Guard and CBP with their small numbers cannot possibly be expected 
to secure every inch of these harbors without the introduction of an information sharing 
system as a force multiplier that would also canvas the smaller ports. 
Single point mooring concept in which all stakeholders truly have a stake 
As the operator had pointed out repeatedly in his interview, the single point 
mooring for regulations would take the United States a long way toward building a 
system of information sharing that all would benefit from. In its current state, where 
regulations are put out, for actions that have been carried out for years and are delineated 
in several other places, the system is broken. Thus, it is known what is broken. To fix it, 
all must come together and give of their time, monies, and efforts. Once this regulatory 
side is fixed, and agreed to by all, the other portions will work their way through similar 
channels and meet the same success. 
Agreements between all port partners as to what needs to be shared 
Clear functional boundaries have to be agreed on, as well as what is required to be 
shared and with whom. Classification of information has traditionally been a stop for 
actions in communication chains as was indicated by three of the five interviewees over 
two different interview questions. What presented itself to MIST researchers was a sort of 
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last mile problem of getting all harbor personnel through the proper screening to gain 
access to information streams. Indeed, one of the largest port partners in Boston, 
MASSPORT continues to use their own ID cards and will do so for the near future. That 
is, until all stakeholders can reach an accord on most issues. This may prove to be an 
excellent area to prove that connections can be made and when they are made tremendous 
efficiencies may be realized. It was pointed out in MISTS Boston report as a next step for 
Boston to Have Massport connect with the Coast Guard. If this connection could be 
made, many of the other port partners would jump on board and progress would ensue. 
Start designs from position of information glut 
Designer two, aside from being perfectly candid in all of her responses, also 
imparted the wisdom of starting designs from the information glut posture. Meaning, the 
Coast Guard and many other organizations are continually in a state of information 
overload. Which is to say, that they have so much information that they are inundated 
with it, and valuable information gets lost in the chaff. By most outward appearances a 
smart push system from some form of Dublin core is required to not burry operators. 
All of the thesis questions have been covered by laying them out, then addressing 
the themes that had emerged over the course of thesis research. The themes themselves 
could be considered to outline the lessons learned by both the Coast Guard and other 
agencies, which hold a great deal of value to future systems requirements discussions. 
These themes and research questions shall form the basis of the discussion and 
framework of Chapter V conclusions, as well as recommendations for future work. 
42 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
43 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
FOR FUTURE WORK 
A. DEEPER LEVELS OF FRAGMENTATION 
What has emerged as an overall finding from the both the MIST seminars and 
interviews that were conducted for this research, are the deeper fragmentation of 
communication of threats and the sidestepping of regulations to accommodate one 
partner’s needs, which ultimately drive system development. When these systems are 
developed without requisite input from harbor operators, their utility is diminished and 
can therefore fall short of overall regulatory synergies. Yet at times, best practices have 
also emerged as a result, such as face–to-face meetings conducted in Boston. Yet, these 
may soon become antiquated through technology and the demands of the people whom 
attend them as a result of time demands from their own jobs. 
1. There is not a “one size fits all” solution to all port partners 
communications needs and it is likely that one has not been conceived 
as of the writing of this thesis 
Although there are many examples of useful communication solutions, which can 
convey threats, few of these would match up with even 10% of an overall system 
requirements, which might achieve the coveted one-size-fits-all label. The more pivotal 
underlying issue is influencing all port partners to agree to a singular standard for 
anything that they would agree to and thus share knowledge to oppose discovered threats. 
This point also highlights one of this thesis’s most important points, that whatever the 
communications solution turns out to be, to have all partners concur, it must be grounded 
in the trust that the Coast Guard has earned in terms of communication sharing.  
To try to improve any one of the existing communication systems to meet all 
partner’s needs would be difficult at best. A much more plausible solution may be to 
develop a new system that has concurrence from all partners from conception to final use. 
One of the best practices mentioned by MIST was the USCG alert system that may be 
included in a future system. This already proven system would likely require very little 
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resources to convey information whether it be terrorist threats or environmental issues as 
operators already employ and trust this system. This system has also earned a reputation 
for accuracy and parsimony in that it was not used very often, and only when there was 
actionable information that needed to be retrieved or conveyed. 
2. A lack of familiarity with the recipients of information that causes 
partners to withhold and not share 
MIST’s careful analysis of partner motivations revealed some of the problems 
that may be addressed to bring partners to continue development. Motivations that in 
particular, can be surrogate communications systems for the development of capabilities 
in communications systems. For instance, the desire to avoid litigation by airlines and the 
desire of commercial shipping companies to avoid costs provide constraints of systems 
that are transparent to users in some instances yet completely visible in others. In a smart 
push type system, the surrogate user needs to find the filtration needed to garner partner 
trust and a willingness to share threat information. 
The results of this research also reveal that the findings from Boston Harbor can 
be scaled to any size harbor. This is because Boston Harbor crosses so many of the 
functional areas found in all harbors. There are few harbors that possess functionalities 
and issues not found in Boston. For example, the presence of an airport in close 
proximity to Boston Harbor allowing airlines partners who move cargo to sea going 
commercial shippers is a characteristic common to large harbors, yet could easily be 
removed from the concerns of smaller harbors. Thus, the shared understanding of the 
issues that occur at Boston may provide quick and easily related issues to a smaller port. 
A Technical Director spoke to another when he indicated that sharing the 
information in a trustworthy method. His concern centered upon who he could trust to 
protect that information and convey it in a manner that is acceptable to its originator. The 
Technical Director also indicated that if a technological solution is to be reached, it 
would have to be one that employs strong encryption that would potentially stay with the 
data from cradle to grave and would ensure that only intended receivers get these 
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messages. With recent communication systems being very publicly defeated, e.g., wiki-
leaks, many people are less trusting of technology for their lives or their security. 
Finally, what can hamper the building of a trusting relationship to transfer 
information correctly can also arise from failed or unresolved historical issues from the 
either the companies or individuals of those companies. Similar to the ways that in small 
organizations word of a disaster travels fast, as do the mistakes of today’s companies who 
sometimes fail to safeguard their highly personnel identifiable information. Usually all 
that it takes is one unfortunate event and the next day the company can be out of business 
due to their tarnished reputation. Companies and their introduction of new technologies 
should consider these issues as development occurs.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Exploration into determining how to ensure all partners commit 
resources to a common system development 
Lately, this has been one of the chief focuses of MIST and will continue to 
perplex those who attempt to resolve given that large number of stakeholders. As noted 
earlier, to improve or build a better communications infrastructure, MIST’s work here 
will continue to be instrumental to unanimously design successful information sharing 
systems. Understanding the motivations during the requirements phase may better 
illustrate areas to focus on as well as areas to avoid. A proper study of developing both a 
tailored understanding of individual harbor issues as well as maintaining institutional 
trust between port partners using adequate security may be beneficial. 
2. The determination that a single information sharing system needs to 
be designed and implemented for a partners to communicate 
One organization has to take on the monumental task of getting organizations to 
agree and more importantly to feed a discussion of requirements of a singular new 
system. As previously discussed the systems that were developed to meet individual 
partner needs has only driven organizations away from one another and strengthened 
barriers against efficient communications amongst all. If multiple organizations’ issues 
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could be focused and agreed to by all, that may form the basis of an overall design 
solution and possibly lead to an approved and universally implemented system. 
Ramifications of this may ripple through other organizations suffering similar 
circumstances like the Joint Services Command’s efforts to create one radio that can be 
used by all organizations. 
3. Developing a map of how a communication system will have to 
develop to please all partners 
To develop an overall design, organizations, it seems, will need to agree that even 
though their individual information sharing system, which they developed for their own 
purposes, works for them, it can be greatly improved in value if it is extended to all 
partners and thus flawed when compared to a universally accepted information sharing 
system. 
To generate this map, trust will have to be the cornerstone for every decision as 
previously illustrated by the Coast Guard. DISA has begun working on this issue, yet has 
remained somewhat secretive about its solutions. As can be imagined, once released, 
adversaries will work to develop methods to subvert security of that system. 
4. Organizations sharing information may also mean sharing sources, 
and perhaps loss of identity 
To coax partners to admit where they have made mistakes, or run into difficulties 
in their own systems will be difficult, yet may also be the most beneficial to the overall 
systems development. There are many stakeholders who believe that this is probably the 
chief issue driving “turf wars,” which is to say that organizations are often embarrassed 
of either the data that they have collected or the manner in which they have collected it. 
For those organizations in this fiscally charged environment, there is a fear of losing 
control of their own systems and subsequently losing potentially their organization’s 
identity. This is a difficult organizational problem, yet needs to be explored and perhaps 





A. MINDMAPS OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 













































A. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS 
1. Operator Interview 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please describe your 
challenges in receiving and distributing that information.   
 
Well right off the bat classification of data and who we can distribute it to. What 
players can get what information in a timely manner? 
 
That also holds true for us receiving it from other sources like JWICS 
 
Interconnectivity: no common system of other core partners for sensors. 
Watchkeeper is attempting to do this now 
 
CBP works for unclassified material but it is not fully plugged in. 
 
Having the linkages already in place so that our core partners already have an idea 
of what type of information we require and vice versa, typically dependent on all 
watch standers to be sharp enough to know that the information that they are 
handling may be relevant to the Coast Guard. 
 
The JTTF which is FBI oriented and the BRIC (Fusion Center) lots of gang 
related information in there. It is a great snapshot of the fragmentation of 
information sources. 
POG (Port Operators’ Group … in Boston, the POG is what other ports 
may call the Harbor Safety Committee. The HSC is a small subset of the 





Lots of redundancies in the information at many of these meetings  
 
o Specifically, what challenges are encountered in information sharing between 
the public and private sector? 
o What are your top three challenges? 
2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control (C2) 
systems to share information?  
 
o What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are used?  
o How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training 
requirement for newly arriving personnel?  
This is a question for the Techies. 
 
3. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors 
considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
 
I can’t answer this as we are not designing, there is thought going into it, as 
evidenced by Watchkeeper, that it is a good example of us tailoring a 
website aggregator that is configurable that we are beta testing. Works 
mostly in the displaying of information which indicates an awareness of 
making these more user friendly. We have come a long way but to what 
degree he can’t say. 
o Ease of use? 
o Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
o Usefulness? 
4. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information 
sharing be improved within the Coast Guard? 
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My pet issue that I am trying to shore up; you are aware of the incredible 
number of information sharing mandates that are being pushed down on us 
which are really already being done in practice but there really is no 
efficiency in the manner in which it is categorized. 
 MOC/REMOC signed by COMDT and ICE coordinating local efforts that 
is a carbon copy of every other edict that is out there. My problem is how 
these are so fragmented and seem to have been created in a vacuum. If you 
take a closer look at the MDA that is supposed to be acting as a hub that has 
tentacles into all the agencies could be implemented into the Maritime 
information sharing environment. Single point mooring that takes all the 
information in and aggregates it (repackages it) we don’t need another 
mandate. Command Center models don’t work because of turf wars, what 
everyone is working toward is one of the virtual collaborative systems. 
MISLE and MAGNET, Watchkeeper that allow the users to configure the 
information that is relevant to them is tailored to them. Everyone coming up 
with their own solutions is not working. 
A central hub analyzed and pushed to the correct parties that are a single 
system that is not a single point of failure. Refer back to the MDA model 
which focus on a hub model that presents the information that can be pushed 
automatically. 
[An example proposed by the interviewer could be an ideal system, role 
based; the technology needs to have a sense of place. Small boat coxswain 
with a PDA changing roles from that of the OOD to that of Coxswain and 
the information that he needs is tailored to that role.]  
 




2. Designer One Interview 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please describe your 
challenges in receiving and distributing that information.   
Specifically, what challenges are encountered in information sharing between 
the public and private sector? 
 
We have probably our biggest challenge is our means of having all the users 
have similar means to receive the information. The Coast Guard uses many 
channels to get information out. Some examples of these may be Homeport 
which is on the web, traditional ones via radio broadcasts. It has been a 
challenge; this problem has been realized for a long time, going back to Marine 
Transportation Systems Reports back in the late 90s. The National Academy of 
Sciences/ Marine Transportation Systems Reports are the Coast Guard sometime 
around 2000. Watchkeeper is a new tool which is under development in the 
Coast Guard Acquisitions, and I have had some involvement with that, not 
currently, but I do know that it was prototyped in Charleston South Carolina and 
it was created to be an interagency operations center piece. So, it would have the 
ability for our port partners to engage for security type information where they 
could simply login. As opposed to the Coast Guard only systems that existed 
behind the Coast Guard’s firewalls, it was the constraint that it has its own 
security that meant you had to log in from outside of the Coast Guard’s data 
network allowing outside users to log in as well. I believe the system lives 
outside the Coast Guard’s Data Network and is in our DMZ for the kind of non-
militarized systems. C3Cen developers could answer a lot more questions on 
that. I am not sure where that is at in the Coast Guards acquisitions cycle but that 






What are your top three challenges? 
 
Well I am a researcher so I don’t really face these challenges directly but we do 
help develop solutions for them. The whole issue of access, like with 
watchkeeper and providing accounts that grant access to watchkeeper from 
within other systems. I think that is still going to be a big hurtle because those 
other organizations like DHS, Local Law Enforcement, and Port Partners all 
have their own systems and we don’t seem to be able to make progress in getting 
our systems to talk to one another which is where I feel the biggest challenge is. 
We don’t share information as much as we share log-ins. Watchkeeper is being 
developed in service oriented architecture, so what it is doing is accessing the 
existing databases which also connected to our inside service architecture, we 
have an enterprise service bus, though there are services that provide the data 
from various sources be it  SANS vessel arrivals or AIS for vessel positions, 
whatever. All those services provide information to the enterprise service but to 
watchkeeper as a consumer of those services. Then you have services within 
watchkeeper that allow users to do queries and find out information about things. 
So, Watchkeeper is being built the right way in that it is not duplicating 
databases or doing any of that. In terms of being a wrapper for separate 
technologies it is and it should be.  [Interview inquired about freeform queries] 
Watchkeeper does not really do freeform queries but there are predesigned 
queries. However, watchkeeper I think is using both Posting and polling for its 
data. 
 
2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control (C2) 
systems to share information?  
 
Watchkeeper again which is in the Coast Guards Acquisition Life cycle in that 
you have defined roles such as sponsors, and sponsors representative, whereas 
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most of the systems in common usage today are in the SDLC system for 
maintenance. So they have configuration boards they have all the areas it was 
fairly structured with SDLC. In R&D we get more of the: we think this is an 
interesting system and we want you to go evaluate it.  
 
What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are used?  
 
We often help develop requirement but we do not produce them, those come from 
the program. We do research that helps them figure out what the requirements 
should be, and that is the operational requirements document not the award but 
that is just one piece that is the foundation document to determine if any of these 
get accepted. That is just one piece but I would argue it is one of the most 
important ones. We have a process that is supposed to be followed, but quite often 
things get started and there is a candidate technology out there and the award is 
often back fit to express the need for the technology. Now I’m not saying that is 
not necessarily bad; as when you are working on requirements you have to be 
cognizant of what potential solutions are out there. You cannot just develop 
requirements in a vacuum or you will either: one, specify things that can’t be done 
or two, you will be specifying things that are very easy to do.   You have to go 
through several iterations to get the best solution. That being said, we do have our 
acquisitions decision points one, two, and three that are mixed in from concept 
development to full production. 
 
How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training requirement 
for newly arriving personnel? 
 
Generally not tested in this manner because to put one of these systems into a unit 
is kind of a big deal and we generally don’t bring real operators to look at systems 
set up wherever. These types of systems have so many connections that they are 
hard to prototype. There are so many pieces and parts that have to have inputs and 
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outputs to them it is just not practical.   Generally, it is done in a more formal 
fashion where you have an actual prototype site determined and there is training 
involved but these people that are testing have their regular jobs that they are 
dealing with as well and it is no small thing to get them to look at something for 
you. Smaller technologies that we are interested in installing on boats, we can do 
that with local units, but again there is a formal process there. [The interviewer 
postulated that many of the technologies that are being tested would have had a 
fair amount of user feedback if they are COTS type systems] 
Well, I’m not sure. Like a lot of software that has been built by designers the 
people designing it build what they think is right, hopefully they have some 
operational experience where they can scrutinize their own process to make sure it 
is a good interface. As customers, we don’t really get a crack at it until it is pretty 
far down the road. 
 
3. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors considered 
in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
o Ease of use? 
o Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
            Usefulness? 
 
These are all highly considered in evaluating systems. We often look at those 
factors in whatever system we are considering. We have a group that does human 
factors at the R&D center and they often get called in to look at systems to 
evaluate them for those concerns. Therefore, it is prominent that we put it right up 







4. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information sharing be 
improved within the Coast Guard? 
 
Everybody still has this single computer mentality that everyone logs into one 
system to get there information where I think that we need to develop more of the 
distributed model and have specific interfaces defined for system to talk to each 
other. So that users in different communities whether it be within the Coast Guard 
or our partners can maintain their own system and connect to our system so that 
we can share whatever information we have determined needs to be shared back 
and forth with them in a more streamlined fashion. An example maybe, a watch 
stander that does not have to have logins to four different systems to do their jobs; 
instead they have one system that has everything that they need fully integrated 
together. We have been working on a project to achieve that sort of thing with 
DISA in a net centric enterprise services information sharing system that the 
Coast Guard could share with our partners in the DoD.   (Interviewer mentioned 
the DISA cloud services that are being developed for the Coast Guard)  I have no 
idea where that is, I got out of that part when they started it. I don’t know if the 
cloud is just the same stuff we were calling the net centric enterprise services that 
tended to be not network centric repository but a controlled infrastructure for 
sharing information. I am not sure if they are using the GIG to do much of that or 
not. I was only familiar with that through the information that we had in common 
with DoD like vessel tracks in AIS and we were also working on vessel arrival 
data to share that data and whoever could subscribe to it through the DISA 
services. So somebody would subscribe and they would just get packets of XML 
data and that was what we were sharing. They could just take that data and put it 
into their system and use it anyway that they wanted to and we did not have to 
worry about the semantics of nomenclature of the systems that they were working 
on.  [Interviewer asked what semantics they were interested in of ours for their 
own pragmatic goals]  Usually they were wanting log-ins to our systems which 
we don’t give out to just anybody and it highlighted the difficulty in getting 
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someone access to systems. Five years from when we started looking at this 
information sharing we are still sharing log-ins and not information. 
 
3. Designer Two Interview 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please describe 
your challenges in receiving and distributing that information.   
o Specifically, what challenges are encountered in information sharing 
between the public and private sector? 
 
 I can’t talk from my own experience, but I can talk about the work that I had 
done with sector command centers where we have a number of difficulties sharing 
information with our partners. Like Customs which its part of DHS and has their 
own firewalls and computer systems; we also have state a local law enforcement 
agencies. We may work together with these partners on a number of different 
things for example when I worked down in Sector Miami which has number of 
law enforcement missions that they prosecute daily in which it is possible that 
they will be working with Florida Fish and Wildlife Services out there, or perhaps 
Customs. The problem that is most frequently observed is different port partners 
have different levels of classified or unclassified information that we can share 
with them. For example we might be able to provide Customs with Secret info; 
but we might only be able to provide local law enforcement with UNCLAS, 
because they don’t hold a security classification. So, one set of information can’t 
be seen by everybody. Also, because Customs has their own set of rules of what 
they can and cannot share, and if our firewalls don’t meet the requirements that 
their firewalls do, we cannot share -- which translates to both policy and 
equipment type problems that get in the way of sharing the information we would 
like to share. I think that we also have some equipment problems in bandwidth 
allocation where someone may be transferring blueprints for a cruise ship that 
everyone is interested in doing a joint boarding on. We might not be able to send 
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the blueprints because our network bandwidth isn’t able to accommodate such a 
large file in addition to all the other things that are already on our network. Video 
data often has to be sacrificed for this reason. There are a number of problems that 
make it hard to share from a tactical standpoint as well. One problem in particular 
that keeps coming up is radio messaging between these different agencies. 
Whereas the Coast Guard deals with channel 16 for the uncovered stuff, i.e., radio 
communications “in the clear,” the local police use a completely different set of 
bands when they are transmitting messages. Therefore, we do not have the same 
equipment that transmits over the same radio bands which are crucial to be able to 
talk to one another. In the past we have done some projects helping specific 
locations do interagency communications and it is quite a hard job because you 
end up needing a different set of equipment and people do not want to be saddled 
carrying two or three different kinds of radios so that when they have to talk to 
customs they have got this radio, and when they are talking to Miami Police 
Department they have got a different radio. It can be difficult. There is also the 
question of what kinds of information do my agency need to keep just for itself 
for what we do? Versus, what am I willing to share with my other partners? 
Therefore, there is a whole bunch of little problems there. One could most aptly 
characterize these problems into two broad categories: technology and turf battles, 
i.e., the mentality that I am special and you don’t need to have your nose in my 
business.   
 
o What are your top three challenges? 
 
I don’t think that I can rank those; it would have to come more from the 
operational folks.  [Speculation]  It is so easy to point a figure at technology and 
say ok well it does not work so how can you… but even when they were doing 
the interagency communications thing a few years back, [although I was not a part 
of it, a friend of mine was heading it up] and even when they were able to provide 
the technology, that was when you would see the policy and turf issues start 
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coming up. It is hard to include everyone because the people from different 
agencies have different training, different backgrounds, there is organizational 
culture that differs between these groups. Now, suddenly they are all trying to 
play on the same field. One of the things that they found out in that project was 
some of the agencies (not sure which ones) spoke in codes so an example of a 
black speed boat coming from this direction, there would be a code seven or 
something like that. So, it gets right down to what exactly you say when you are 
trying to communicate with people that do not have any knowledge of your 
vocabulary, and cannot understand what it is that you want; therefore, they cannot 
do what is needed because of their lack of understanding. 
 
3. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control (C2) 
systems to share information?  
 
There is a different method -- if there is a method at all -- depending on who is 
designing and developing the system.   Which is part of the charm of the Coast 
Guard … in that we have a number of different groups that do this sort of work 
and it is something that we really need to do a better job of?  Speaking around this 
to maybe give us a little context, I think part of the problem is that we get into too 
much of a hurry. Somebody says we have got this problem and we have money, 
congress just gave us something to do; let’s throw money at it, let’s fix it, and 
let’s get onto something else. In our haste to do something, we do either whatever 
seems easiest or “this technology looks really cool” and go with that. Thus we get 
too technology focused and we forget about the people and the tasks that need to 
be supported by that technology. Now, I am on my human factors soapbox.  
[Interviewer mentioned own misunderstanding that the DISA cloud would be the  
solution to 90% of our information sharing problems]  When the cloud does come 
into service, the location of different services will be totally obscured from the 
user. The Coast Guard had a Hawkeye system that we put together for one of our 
first ventures into security and surveillance of ports and waterways. Hawkeye was 
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part of the work that we were doing in Miami so I will pick on them. Hampton 
Roads was also a site, so I will pick on them as well. Prior to this venture, we had 
nothing that would allow watch standers to see vessel traffic in and around the 
port, so anything was considered to be better than what we had right then. C2CEN 
put together a very nice prototype that made for an excellent research tool in 
which we could put video cameras out there, we could get AIS tracks coming in, 
and we got radar tracks that would provide input into geographical information 
system. Therefore, now you can see who is out in your port, you may not know 
who they all are, but you at least know where vessel traffic is coming from, you 
know where it is headed.   Hawkeye, as a prototype was a really great tool to help 
you understand what the Command Center watch stander’s need is for vessel 
traffic info and what the capability needs to be to fill the need for vessel traffic 
info. The mistake that we made was “well gee that looks pretty good, let’s give it 
to everybody.”  We started rolling out something that was not thought through 
very well, isn’t integrated with anything else in the command center, and just 
becomes one more tool that you have to have a body sitting in front of. Thus the 
system, which could have provided very useful data, could not because it was not 
integrated with any other systems and was relegated to being nowhere near as 
useful as it could be. This is the way that we should not develop new equipment. I 
am sure that every command center that has that system is really happy because 
they can see things that they never could have before; but it requires an extra 
watch person to man a terminal, and the Coast Guard never has extra people. If 
we had just thought a little bit more about how to implement a system such as this 
and really nailed down the integration part (who should be doing this, who should 
be getting these data feeds…)  A pretty good example of “stick it out there, find 
out that it is wrong…), but you do learn something from it. The problem comes in 
the form of you just have to deal with it for the next ten years until we get funding 
to do something better. I see that as our biggest problem; that we don’t look 
before we leap. It makes sense at a very high level, absolutely, that we need that 
capability, but we need to understand who needs it, what information is necessary, 
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how does it fit into the rest of the jobs that we are asking these people to do for us. 
All those human factors and procedural type of things need to be addressed.   
      [Interviewer mentioned an infrastructure issue of using a lot of servers to 
handle this great glut of information] Especially in a busy port like Miami where 
you have 40+ vessels a day coming in to drop or pick up cargo, cruise ships, and 
an abundance of recreational boaters out there doing who knows what. There is a 
lot of data to look at and what has not been done yet, what there has not been any 
R&D on, is the number of people per unit of data that this type of system 
demands. The sheer volume of information coming into a port like Miami would 
not be practical for a single watch stander to leaf through and draw any actionable 
intelligence from. There has been some on and off R&D efforts to develop some 
kind of a decision support tool that will look at different vessel tracks and do the 
comparison of logical operations to look for anomalies; e.g., is this vessel going 
where a vessel of this type “should” be going to sound an alarm. Another thing 
that happens when a system like Hawkeye gets put into a command center is that 
we have never developed any type of training for watch standers to be able to 
determine what is normal, and what we should do with this now that you have it 
on your desk. So we just do things, and granted we have a lot of smart people 
working for us, but we get drawn in with this cool factor and throw it over the 
wall and just assume that the guys in field are going to know what to do with it. 
 
o What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are used?  
o How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training requirement 
for newly arriving personnel? 
 
Well, they should be driving training but they are not in the way that they should 
be. My understanding, unfortunately, is that most of the training that is provided 
these days is nothing more than button ology. We are very scarce on decent 
operational training. What I mean by this is:  we teach people what is on each 
screen, and what functions you can get by pushing buttons X and Y. What we 
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don’t do, and should do, is say – here’s what your job is. Let’s take some 
operational scenarios, and we’ll show you how to integrate this new equipment so 
that you can do an even better job. We need training that is based on Watch 
stander procedures – and how those procedures will CHANGE, and how to get 
the information they need from the new equipment. Unfortunately, the poor watch 
standers are left to figure that out themselves … and a lot of otherwise useful 
functionality is ignored, because no one showed them how to integrate it into their 
jobs. 
 
4. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors considered 
in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
o Ease of use? 
o Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
            Usefulness? 
 
Not too much as far as I can tell; at this point, I need to let you know some of my 
bounds here, over at the R&D Center with the exception of Rescue 21 and the 
Hawkeye system, I have not been part of an actual acquisition. We are usually up 
front looking at prototypes or thinking about capabilities, but once it rolls up into 
a real acquisition, it goes to a whole different project group at headquarters and 
people in CG-1B3 that was only stood up about three or four years ago are now 
the human factors folks that are actually responsible for acquisition projects. From 
projects that I have seen, human factors are not considered very much. A piece of 
that is that when we have centers such as C2CEN, who know the technology 
backwards and forwards, they become “too expert” and thus build something that 
works for them and they don’t really think about who the eventual user is going to 
be. Just little things like getting them to change the lexicon so that it is Coast 
Guard operational words and not computer science words are surprisingly 
difficult. Rescue 21, (I guess that it is ok to talk about that now because the 
system has been totally revamped), had something like seventeen to twenty button 
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pushes to get sensitive, time-critical information into Rescue 21. Well you may 
have this poor person sitting there waiting to be rescued, on the radio, trying not 
to drown while talking to you, and we saddled our people with that kind of 
difficult-to-use system at the point that it went through OT&E. Fortunately our 
senior commanders said no way are we going to go anywhere with that system 
until it has been greatly improved. However, I have not seen it since it has gone 
through its final reworks, but that was a system that was acquired, human factors 
was written in the contract requirements but obviously the contractor did not have 
Human Factors personnel on its team. Had Rescue 21 been acquired today, 1B3 
would have stepped in and fixed the problems way before OT&E. Rescue 21 
technologically is a sound program that does things we never before imagined 
with ease, which is lovely, but it was not done in a way that made it helpful to the 
operator. One example of the poor user interfaces and system lacking integration 
was Rescue 21 into the Command Center equipment suite – a process the watch 
standers called “sneaker net.” In order for the communications watch stander to 
get certain information over to the Ops guy, he had to write it out to a CD and run 
it over to Ops because they did not have any way of marrying Rescue 21 system 
with SarOps or anything else other equipment in the Command Center. It Rescue 
21 just was not constructed with the users in mind; it came more from the 
technological point of view. 
 
5. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information sharing be 
improved within the Coast Guard? 
 
What kind of information are we talking about here?  [Interviewer provided a 
scenario of intelligence that the Coast Guard had of a wanted fugitive on a 
commercial ship pulling into Boston Harbor, how could we improve that 
exchange and keep sensitive information from falling into the wrong hands.]  
What hits me first is that the agencies need to come-together first and discuss each 
one’s needs so that we understand how certain kinds of information may be very 
68 
 
important to us but not be so important to another agency. If that other agency 
comes across that information and they are aware that it is very important to us, 
then they may be more willing to share it or maybe think that it is something to 
share. Thus, I think from an organizational point of view, if we understand the 
kind of the hot buttons of our brother and sister agencies that may be a good 
starting point. With respect to sharing information with the public or the maritime 
community the thing that comes to mind is something we learned while doing a 
Western Rivers project a couple of years back. We asked mariners what they did 
if they noticed buoys off station or problems in the waterways. We found out that 
people on commercial vessels moving up and down the Mississippi don’t even 
report this stuff any longer because they know that nothing will be done about it 
by the CG, or nobody from CG ever gets back to them about it when they do 
report something. So they have no idea if the information that they pass gets acted 
on or will be acted on. It seems like it is something that could be done fairly easily 
with all of the interactive mapping tools that we have at our disposal. One could 
potentially put something onto an ECDIS (electronic chart) that indicates that 
“yes we know this buoy is off station, it will be fixed in a couple of months or we 
have somebody coming down river to check on it”  I think that this was workload 




4. Technical Director Interview 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please describe 
your challenges in receiving and distributing that information.   
o Specifically, what challenges are encountered in information sharing 
between the public and private sector? 
            What are your top three challenges? 
 
Ok, well I think what we have found in our maritime domain awareness data 
sharing community of interest, when we started that project we really focused on 
data sharing and we found that data sharing really was not the issue. We started 
with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) information system and several 
agencies had AIS information in databases: the Navy had some, DHS had some, 
and the Coast Guard had some. There also was the NAIS major acquisition, they 
all had information, and they wanted to share it. So we thought, ok, well, let’s get 
some unclassified AIS and put it on the net centric enterprise service program 
which was the DISA portal and let’s go ahead and share that among agencies. So, 
that wasn’t actually that hard in that what they had to do was take the different 
ways the information was represented and what type of status schema each of 
them was using, get together and agree on a common schema. Once they agreed 
on a common schema and they wrote it in XML, then everyone who had a 
proprietary data set, simply had to develop a wrapper to translate the data from 
that common schema. When you were a publisher, you would publish on the 
NCIS data bus, and then a subscriber would subscribe to it, in that common 
format and then translate back to their proprietary format. That actually was 
relatively easy, but, even with unclassified AIS information, which we thought 
would be our most useful data set to manipulate, we found out that the 
unclassified set of data that the Navy intelligence program had was still sensitive 
because it came from commercial shipping companies and those commercial 
shipping companies did not want their competitors to have information on where 
70 
 
their ships were. Mostly because their competitors could use that information for 
competitive advantage. So, what we had to do was figure out a way to safeguard 
that information. We started by just having a special channel for that but that kind 
of defeated the purpose of information sharing. So we spent the next three years 
investigating different ways to secure information when it is in a public in a 
subscription type format. In the three years that we were engaged in that activity 
we never actually found a technology that did that for us, because even if you 
would secure it as you placed it on an enterprise service bus, the publisher did not 
have any assurances that the information would not get into the wrong hands 
somewhere down the road.   So that was actually the biggest challenge that we 
had been securing access for the data sharing. That is really, what your thesis is 
about information assurance.   I left however and I sort of lost track of it. If you 
can get down to SPAWAR and you look into crypto binding you should be able to 
see what sort of success they had there. It was not classified technology but it was 
encryption because what they would do is encrypt the data and wrap it in an 
encrypted layer that would stay with that information throughout its life cycle. I 
am not sure where that ended up going as I changed jobs and lost touch with it. 
Mr. Green was the gentleman’s name and he could update you on the technology 
but that was the most promising technology that we found for securing the 
information. 
 
2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control (C2) 
systems to share information?  
o What are the procedures, requirements, and decision points that are used?  
o How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training requirement 
for newly arriving personnel?  
 
Well, it is really in acquisitions which really everything is. Federal acquisition 
policy regulates the process on that so really in the Coast Guard and DHS, the 
Coast Guard has a Major System Acquisitions Manual and DHS has the Systems 
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Engineering Life cycle which is very similar in process for starting with 
documenting the need, and identifying the capability gap, then generate the 
requirements document, the award, then go perform the market research, research 
and development, prototyping, then issuing the request for proposal and nine 
times out ten it is going to be a commercial acquisition where you are going to 
allow the private sector to develop the solution and compete against each other. 
So you do the request for proposal then you do the source selection, then you go 
through the protests, write the contract and they start developing that solution for 
you. The most important aspect is that the sponsor remains engaged throughout 
the entire process i.e., the sponsor starts it, the sponsor works with research and 
development, the sponsor works with the acquisitions community, the sponsor 
works with the contracting community, the sponsor participate in selection, the 
sponsor makes sure that the resources are available for all phases including O and 
M and disposal. A lot of times when you start down the SDLC, SELC, or the 
MSAM there are so many requirements for review and documents; people forget 
to walk along with the other people that are attached to that process. Typically 
what you have is a contractor in California and you are somewhere on the East 
Coast and from headquarters that is difficult to keep track of. That is about the 
best answer that I can provide in terms of how it is to be done (following the 
acquisition process) otherwise you end up getting so far down the road and a 
protest comes along and wipes out the whole thing and you are back to square 
one.   
 One of the best things that I witnessed (surprisingly you do not see this 
very often) at the Navy research lab that were doing their vessel tracking project 
they were doing something called user juries that consisted of every three or six 
months I am not exactly sure what the interval was they would fly Coast Guard 
and Navy People in from different watch centers and sit them down in a room 
with the technology and have it linked to all these different data feeds and have 
them run through scenarios and give them comments over the couple of days that 
they lasted and that was a very good way of doing that. They were using a spiral 
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development process at the time which allowed them to get really good feedback 
from the users while they were using the technology. 
 
3. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors 
considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
o Ease of use? 
o Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
         Usefulness? 
 
That really varies by the system, one of the real reasons that the R&D program 
was brought into the acquisitions directorate in Commandants Intent Action 
Order (CIAO) one which was one of ten reorganization proposals for 
modernization was to get the expertise in human factor into the front end 
research of the acquisition process. The R&D center did an analysis of rescue 
21 program in its early days and gave it some good feedback on the way that the 
windows were structured. So they had a lot of human factors looked at through 
Dr. Blue was the human factors expert at the R&D center than while I was 
there. But this was before R&D was brought into the acquisitions directorate. 
Whereas, now, since I have left they are probably engaged more at the front end 
of acquisitions for the technology/human aspect of building a technology. 
 
4. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information sharing 
be improved within the Coast Guard? 
 
Like I said, I think that the challenge was being able to safeguard the data in a 
public publish and subscribe environment. So, I think if we had, in my belief 
was that in the three years that we did the project data sharing community of 
interest project, the belief was that was going to be handled in one policy. So, 
they stood up a policy group, and for three years the policy group could not 
solve that problem. They even got lawyers involved who (very competent and 
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enthusiastic lawyers) were involved and when they started they said if we will 
just come up with a policy for this data sharing so that everybody knows who 
they can share with and who you could not share it with. This didn’t work 
either. At the end of the project, I concluded that it had to be a technology 
solution not a non-material solution there had to be a way… You were in radio 
navigation, you were working with FAA, you worked with them in Loran and 
you work them in GPS all the time. The FAA is very careful about how many 
nines they assign to a safety and security so they will say they will design this to 
five nines (99.99999% availability.)  The FAA, they would calculate that, so 
you would give them a technology or you would give them the probability 
scenario and they would calculate the number of nines for an accident in the air. 
That information would be used to build the system, the necessary redundancies 
for the system, the specification for the system, and that would be a level of 
confidence that a passenger would have in flying in that system. My conclusion 
was that it had to be a technology solution and there had to be an independent 
body that calculated an assurance level to several nines. One that had the power 
to say ok, if you implement this technology you would have 3 nines of security 
that you information is not getting into the wrong hands. If you needed four 
nines than you would have to use this, five nines this, sort of like the AES 
encryption thing where depending on how sensitive the data is you would use a 
different encryption method. Some of these choices may gobble up a lot of 
bandwidth, or one that costs you a lot for really sensitive data. So, I was just 
kind of thinking (PGP) Pretty Good Privacy is good enough for this data, I just 
want to make sure that this picture does not get on the Internet. So you had to 
have the independent body like SPAWAR has that crypto binding that they used 
the NSA as their independent board who is really the gold standard in 
information security. So, I liked that aspect of it.     In a perfect world, you don’t 
even need information assurance; you would only have to care about sharing. 
Alright, now the thing that is interesting is that in the JWICS system when you 
have the SCI information on the JWICS, they actually close the whole system. 
74 
 
So you share within the system but you don’t share with port partners, you don’t 
share with OGAs and you don’t share with your international partners. Or, you 
can do it point to point. So when you are talking about the GENSER system or 
the JWICS systems they close the system off and they assure information that 
way. When you are talking about unclassified data you are talking about dealing 
with port partners, you are talking about dealing with OGAs and international 
partners in the unclassified environment, it is a lot harder to safeguard the 
information then it is when you just close it off and you only give it to people 
who are cleared and have the need to know. I think that in the imperfect world if 
we could get to the point where we have a technology solution that was certified 
by the NSA to provide such different levels of assurance for such different 
levels of sensitivity that I think that we could unlock the information sharing 
world. That is what I think that we need, because you have to assure the 
publisher that their information will be safe before they will publish. That is the 
key; not data sharing itself so much as data security as exemplified perpetuated 
by confidence that one’s information will only be viewed by ones intended 
audience.   
 Push data is a topic of great interest in contrast to that I witnessed in data 
sharing communities of interest was that it was a pull type system. It was ok, 
let’s see what information is out there, which is Internet type of stuff, you can 
look up something on a webpage and get no information. There are several 
search engines that illustrate this; all that it does is display the title the engine 
page until you give it constraints to search from that the system engages and 
searches the World Wide Web for matches. Thus, a discovery and retrieval, then 
you are not overloading the user. There is the whole other aspect of that where 
you have automatic systems automatically going out and retrieving information 
that can be analyzed which is data fusion. One of the customers of the Coast 
Guards R&D Center indicated that “I don’t need more information, I need 
information fusion” Like the tools that is the Naval Research Center’s vessel 
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tracking system was (an information fusion system.)  They actually installed it 
at MIFICLANT and I think MIFICPAC and it is probably still in MIFICLANT. 
5. Systems Manager Interview 
1. As a governing agency leveraging many information sources, please describe 
your challenges in receiving and distributing that information.   
 
The biggest challenge, (if I had to put it in a nutshell), for receiving and 
distributing information would be the quality of data that we are able to pull in 
from the various information systems that are out there. This kind of indicates 
another problem in that the sources that are out there are numerous and present a 
challenge for our operators to categorize into functional areas. This diversity of 
stovepipe type systems requires our personnel to dig into each source and develop 
a means to warehouse it, then tap into that information and manipulate it at as 
they see fit based on the algorithms that will drive a decision or solution set to get 
where they are going. 
 
Specifically, what challenges are encountered in information sharing between the 
public and private sector? 
 
That is a really good question from my perspective or a difficult question because 
we don’t interface with the public too often as much as they do individual 
members of the service. This question is not really relevant to me. In terms of my 
previous experience though as a Lieutenant he had a job with the maritime 
domain awareness in regards to information sharing stuff when he interfaced with 
the public. One of the biggest challenges we faced was getting everybody into the 
same room and getting them to agree on what types of information needed to be 





What are your top three challenges? 
 
 [So, would you rank quality of information as the top or do you have a ranking of 
your challenges] From my current perspective in the CGBI staff I would say 
absolutely, when we go out and speak to like a sector staff, we are always getting 
pushback on every single visit that they make, it’s “Hey, you know I went into 
your system, and I saw this or you guys told me this and that is not the case or this 
is not true. Why are you reporting bad information?” I literally have to stand there 
and say ok, I can look into this for you but I can’t change what is being reported 
because at the end of the day I am pulling from a system that already exists (a 
system of record) that someone else is in charge of… This is an example of what 
makes quality of information such a big deal from my perspective. Because we 
have to go back to those system owners and data managers and ask about their 
internal quality control measures and how that information comes into existence. 
There is also an element of reminding those system owners that they are not the 
only ones to look at that data so more effort needs to be applied to fidelity. Also 
making sure that they know the information has utility outside of their systems or 
warehouses where it is making spread sheets. A lot of times the people that are 
developing these systems or an initial data set are the ones that will be the greatest 
users of that information. It is an illustration of the light going on when they 
recognize the customer is trying to hold them accountable. 
 
One of my observations has been that when IT designs systems one of their 
focuses is to get as much information to the end-users as possible. Then leaving it 
to that end user to figure out exactly what it is that they need to make their 
decision. When the reality is that the specific information that they need is a lot 
less than what that IT person thinks of when they are diagraming user needs and 
so they are simply overwhelmed with information. Usually the answer that end-
users need is there but they have to go digging for it. 
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2. What is the method used to design and/or select Command and Control (C2)   
systems to share information?What are the procedures, requirements, and 
decision points that are used?  
 
I’m going to be honest with you, when the program first started, the methodology 
was: What is available? Who will talk to us? What can we actually pull into our 
enterprise data warehouse? That is really what happened, and that was ok for the 
initial phase. The next phase being, now we have this information, what can we 
do with it?  As we were able to do that, it ended up becoming more of a proof of 
concept; like “look at all the neat, cool things that we can do, pull data from this 
group, that group, and the group over here, with which we created this really nice 
product. Then after creating this product and doing this proof of concept, we were 
able to go back out and say ok, now you see how this system works, we can now 
do this for systems that you are interested in Commander or Admiral. Won’t you 
please work with us; and we will develop the system to satisfy your needs. That 
was the initial approach that we took, so as far as an initial methodology, I guess 
you might say it was a proof of concept based on any information that you were 
able to collect (with little attention given to human factors.)  
 
How do requirements for information sharing systems drive training requirement 
for newly arriving personnel? 
 
Well in theory the needs of the training requirement should be the guiding 
principle behind the development of the information sharing system because the 
whole point is to get the information to the people that use the system. In reality, I 
think what happens is again once we have something in place we tend to train to 
that with little attention given to what is needed. And what is needed tends to 
come after based on the training that is given. So, our folks, what they will do is 
go out and say ok this is CGBI, this is what it looks like, these are the systems that 
we pull from and we will actually show in our opening presentation all of the 
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systems that we pull from. We may also speak a little bit to the types of 
information that comes from those systems. Then we will go into the various 
cubes and reports and products that we have and demonstrate how we manipulate 
some of those data sources to meet our needs and glean information based on the 
data that we are pulling into our own enterprise data warehouse. What happens 
after that is the folks that are being trained will come back to us and they will say 
“hey this was really cool and I liked your training, but what I really need is to see 
information that is coming from this system of record and I did not see that 
system listed in the slide presentation that you did. So, how do I go about getting 
this system of record listed and also once I get it listed I would like to know how 
to build measures that will help me take advantage of the information that I will 
be pulling from those systems of record once it is added?”  For this we have an 
actual measures division if you will and they will go out and sit with the client 
and build metrics that help determine the value of the information they are 
providing to the client. So, they are as responsive to client needs as possible, but 
often what the client has a mental picture of as a system of record is not really a 
system of record and they will try to work with them and see if we can get the 
system they want into CGBI by steering them toward an actual system of record 
or steer them down a path to building their own system. We will even do things 
like try and help them to develop something like a flat file and pull that into the 
OSC enterprise service bus. Sometimes we can do stuff that way, that is not 
always the case, it just depends on resource availability. The best way to deal with 
this sort of thing is to get information into an actual system of record, but 
sometimes a client just can’t do it, or there is nothing available to support them 
and we end up having to tell them no. We try not to do that, but that is sometimes 
the reality and there is just nothing that we can do for them. 
 
3. With regard to information sharing, to what extent are human factors 
considered in the selection of a potential C2 system, such as? 
o Ease of use? 
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o Desirability (of wanting to use the system)?  
             Usefulness? 
 
CGBI is not in the business of selecting new systems; however, they are in the 
business of trying to improve the ones that we have. When it comes to human 
factors driving what we do, I would say very much so. Because one of the things 
that our current flag officer is really, really good about (and we are excited that he 
is) because it means funding us is the idea behind our system. He came out and 
said “Look, you know this is a great product that you guys have, but, the thing is 
that when folks go to use it, there is this heavy lift on the training side, there is a 
heavy lift in exactly what you can get from this system. I need you to make it easy, 
I need the one click, two click solution.” So it would appear that human factors are 
going to be shaping our acquisitions and development for much of the foreseeable 
future and how existing systems such as CGBI will be upgraded in the future. We 
are working on this thing now called CGBI 3.0 and one of the things that we are 
looking to do is literally make it easier to use weather that be place tickers on the 
bottom of the screens, or e-mail notifications that the user has to pull out, or RSS 
feeds. So human factors are critical and they will continue to be shaping future 
Coast Guard systems.   Another characteristic of Coast Guard is systems are that 
they are generally the product of a single persons idea of a great system and where 
I am going with this is a person gets tasked with looking into something and they 
build a little system of their own that is functional for that need. Someone will see 
that setup and voice it that it should become an enterprise system output when that 
is almost impossible to achieve. Then the person who had the idea originally has 
been reassigned or moved on and the service has this massive system trying to 
implement their idea. This situation tends to highlight the importance of making 
people document both their thought process and how they implement things. 
 
4. In a perfect world – without any constraints - how might information sharing be 




 What I would say or what I would do is try to improve the governance section and not 
only control what units are allowed to purchase IT equipment. Finally, A focus on 
passing knowledge, enforcing standardization, and holding people accountable for 
their actions would take us long way. 
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